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i
QUESTION PRESENTED

May the probationer permissibly be required to
“remain drug free” as a condition of her probation, and may
she permissibly be punished for violating that condition,
where the probationer suffers from substance use disorder
[SUD], and where her continued use of substances despite
negative consequences is a symptom of that disorder.
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are addiction specialists in scholarship,
practice and law. The social and legal implications of drug
addiction have been a central focus of their work, which
includes numerous important books, articles and public
presentations on this issue.
Amici believe this case raises important questions
about principles of behavior, criminal responsibility, and
the sound and fair administration of criminal justice. Their
teaching, research and clinical experience on the subject
have given them a deep appreciation of whether the
behavior of people who are addicted, including seeking and
using prohibited substances, is responsive to incentives.
This case squarely presents this question and hinges on the
answer to it. We believe that we can provide the Court with
conceptual, scientific and clinical considerations that
demonstrate that the brain-disease model of addiction is
highly contested and, indeed, contradicted by the data.
These conceptual, scientific and clinical consideration also
reveal that addicts have the capacity to respond to
incentives and reasons.
A complete list of amici who reviewed and join in
this brief is included in the attached Appendix. Amici file
this brief solely as individuals and not on behalf of any
institution with which they are affiliated.
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Amici represent neither party in this action, and offer the
following views on this matter.
_____________
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This brief is a critique of the brain disease model and
many supposed implications of that model. It begins with
a brief history of the model and moves to a discussion of the
motivations behind the characterization of addiction as a
“chronic and relapsing brain disease.” We follow with an
enumeration of fallacious inferences based upon the brain
disease model, including the very notion that addiction
becomes a “brain disease” simply because it has
neurobiological correlates. Regardless of whether addiction
is labeled a brain disease, the real question, we contend, is
whether the behavioral manifestations of addiction are
unresponsive to contingencies. We then present an
overview of data demonstrating that addiction is a set of
behaviors whose course can be altered by foreseeable
consequences. The same cannot be said of conventional
brain diseases such as Alzheimer’s or multiple sclerosis.
The best scientific and clinical data we have do not support
the view that addicts are unable to refrain from using
substances by choice. By “choice” we mean the product of
the capacity to respond to incentive and reasons, which
obviously varies among addicts but which are virtually
never entirely lost. Data amply show that addicts retain
that capacity. Finally, we demonstrate how a decision in
favor of the probationer could have significant implications
for the future of treatment-based approaches to criminal
justice, as well as for criminal responsibility more
generally. We conclude that the probationer’s claim should
be denied because it rests on refuted scientific premises
and will have negative consequences if it is accepted.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF ADDICTION
AS A BRAIN DISEASE IS SCIENTIFICALLY,
CLINCALLY AND CONCEPTUALLY
CONTESTED

This Part first addresses the origin of the brain
disease model and is followed by a discussion of its
rhetorical function. We show that despite claims that the
model is “generally accepted,” it is in fact highly contested
and exceedingly controversial in the scientific community.
Many eminent scholars reject it, and those who do accept
it often do so based on reasons extraneous to its validity. It
then turns to conceptual confusions inherent in the model,
flawed analogies of addiction to other, recognized diseases
and to the process of becoming addicted. The final section
demonstrates that adopting a brain disease model of
addiction does not reduce stigma. Although the
QUESTION PRESENTED uses the term, substance use
disorder (SUD), we use the far more common term for the
phenomenon, “addiction,” throughout this brief.
A. The Origin of the Brain Disease Model
Within the medical and research communities, the
dominant narrative holds that addiction is a “brain
disease.” In a seminal article published 20 years ago in
Science, “Drug Addiction is a Brain Disease, and It
Matters,” Alan Leshner PhD, then director of the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, or NIDA, part of the National
Institutes of Health, proclaimed that addiction was a brain
disease on the ground that “addiction is tied to changes in
brain structure and function.” He had previewed the new
formulation in 1995 to addiction experts, but the exposition
two years later in Science is considered its official
introduction to the broad scientific community. The braindisease model has since become a staple of medical school
education and drug counselor training and even appears in
the antidrug lectures given to high-school students (Koop,
2007). Rehab patients routinely learn that they have a
chronic brain disease. And the American Society of
Addiction Medicine, the largest professional group of
physicians specializing in drug problems, calls addiction “a
primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation,
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memory and related circuitry” (American Society of
Addiction Medicine, 2011). Drug czars under Presidents
Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama have all
endorsed the brain-disease framework at one time or
another (Smith, 2007). The Surgeon General under
President Obama endorsed the formulation in a 2016
report on drug addiction, the first time the Office of
Surgeon General ever addressed addiction outside of
nicotine and smoking. The brain-disease model has been
featured in a major documentary on HBO, discussed on
talk shows and used in Law and Order, and has been on
the covers of Time and Newsweek. The model has become
dogma. Like all articles of faith, it is often believed without
question, especially by addiction counselors and other
clinicians.
(Massing, 2000; Rose & Volkow, 2012;
Lemonick, 2007; Interlandi, 2008).
Leshner’s successor at the helm of NIDA,
psychiatrist Nora Volkow, has been a strong proponent of
the brain disease model. As she explained in an agency
newsletter, the “brain [of an addicted person] is no longer
able to produce something needed for our functioning and
that healthy people take for granted, free will.” According
to Volkow, the inferior frontal gyrus, part of the brain’s
frontal lobe (a region that plays a key role in managing
impulsive actions), serve as a set of “brakes” on drug
consumption. Addiction disrupts the function of the brakes
so that “even if I choose to stop,” she told a radio audience,
“I am not going to be able to;” the brakes can’t perform their
inhibitory function (Heyman, 2009).
Before Leshner and his NIDA colleagues designated
addiction a disease of the brain — meaning that addiction
is fundamentally a drug-induced disorder of disrupted
brain function — doctors and much of the public regarded
addiction as a vague sort of “disease” that manifested as an
uncontrollable drive to use drugs or alcohol. Leshner coined
a durable metaphor, writing that drugs “hijack” the brain’s
motivational and reward circuitry, thereby making the
signs of addiction, the persistent seeking and using of
substances, involuntary. “It may start with the voluntary
act of taking drugs,” he said, “but once you’ve got
(addiction), you can’t just tell the addict, ‘Stop,’ any more
than you can tell the smoker ‘Don’t have emphysema”’
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(Leshner, 1997). We explain in a later section why this is
untrue and why addiction and conventional diseases are
not analogous.
We also address the specific meaning of
“compulsion” in the context of addiction and in relation to
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fifth Edition, of the
American Psychiatric Association, or DSM-5. In brief, the
Manual does not even contain the word "compulsion" with
respect to addiction, nor does it refer to drug taking as an
"uncontrollable" act. Instead, it sets out criteria for
"impaired control" and states that a patient might
manifest impaired control by, among other things, "taking
more drug than initially intended" and by relapsing. In
other words, “compulsive” does not mean beyond one’s
control. Another relevant passage in DSM-5 that we
subsequently discuss is its “Cautionary Statement for
Forensic Use,” which warns that the definitions of mental
disorders it contains were developed to meet the needs of
clinicians, public health professionals, and researchers but
“not all of the technical needs of the courts and legal
professionals” (at p.25). The statement also notes that a
diagnosis, even one involving impairments of control, does
not imply that the person so diagnosed cannot control his
or her behavior” (id.)
Let us now consider the neuroscientific data that are
marshaled in support of the brain-disease model. First,
however, it is necessary to insert a caution concerning the
methodology used in studies of the neurobiological
underpinning of addiction because those findings apply to
the work discussed in this and following sections. Virtually
all neuroscience of addiction studies use as their subjects,
addicts who are in treatment for addiction. This group of
addicts is therefore not a random, representative sample of
addicts. Compared with all addicts, the study population
is disproportionately diagnosed with other mental
disorders; in other words, the subjects are “co-morbid”
(“dually diagnosed”) for addiction and mental illness. This
means that one cannot reliably know whether any brain
findings associated with these subjects are accounted for
by addiction, by the other disorder, or by some combination
or interaction between the two. Even findings considered
by some to be well-established must therefore be evaluated
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and responded to cautiously.
Although many
neuroscientists who work on addiction write as if their
findings disclose a strict causal connection between certain
brain regions and addictive behavior, virtually all such
studies indicate only association (correlation) and claims
about causation are unwarranted. To complicate matters
further, many brain imaging studies have not been
replicated (reproduced) and probably could not be (Szucs &
Ioannides, 2017). This “failure to replicate” is due to
several factors including small sample sizes, statistical
under-powering, and spatial uncertainty relating to
measured regions of interest (ROI) in the brain. These and
other problems have routinely led to the erroneous
reporting of weak correlations as much stronger than they
are (Eklund et al, 2016).
On the basis of studies with rats and primates, we
have learned that natural rewards such as food, water, and
social interactions with conspecifics trigger the release of
dopamine in reward circuits (e.g., the striatum).
Stimulants (e.g., cocaine and amphetamine) also trigger
the release of dopamine in reward circuits. These and
related findings encouraged the idea that neuroscientists
have a successful understanding of addiction. For example,
Nora Volkow in a talk titled “The Unyielding Power of
Dopamine” (Volkow, 2017) argued that all drugs cause
addiction by way of their effects on dopaminergic neurons.
However, she ignored well-established research showing
that marijuana, nicotine, and opioids typically have little
impact on striatal dopamine, yet are addictive. For
example, in a study with heroin addicts, a 50 mg dose of
heroin produced a desirable euphoric high but no release in
dopamine in the striatum (Daglish et al., 2008). Moreover,
as is the case for brain studies of addiction in general, the
evidence for a causal link is missing. For example, rats
continue to prefer saccharin to cocaine even though
stimulants have a much greater impact on dopamine than
saccharin does (Lenoir et al., 2007).
In a scholarly review of the dopamine brain theory
of addiction, published recently in Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, Nutt and his colleagues (2015) cautioned
their fellow neuroscientists that addiction is a complex
phenomenon and that brain theories, like all theories,
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require scrutiny. Put more generally, the article’s point
was that enthusiasm for brain theories of addiction, and in
particular those based on dopamine, has greatly outpaced
research addressing causal relations between the brain
and addiction.
The second part of the brain-based account of
addiction is that addicts are compulsive drug users because
drugs change the brain (e.g., Leshner, 1999, 2001).
However, as we show in Sections I and II, this assumption
is wrong. As research progresses, we will learn much more
about the role of the brain in addiction, but what we learn
will not change the well-established facts that addicts
retain the capacity to choose to stop using drugs.
B. Rhetorical Functions of the Brain Disease
Model
Efforts to position addiction as a “brain disease”
were intended to persuade politicians and society to take
the problem seriously other than as a moral failure. The
model’s appeal is obvious: It is tidy. It signifies medical
gravitas and neuroscientific sophistication. In practical
terms, advocates of the brain-disease model hoped that this
portrayal would inspire insurance companies to expand
coverage for addiction and politicians to allocate more
funding for research and treatment (Babor, 1990; Rosen &
Savory, 2012). Prior to serving as NIDA director, Leshner
served as acting director of the National Institute of Mental
Health. There, he saw how brain-disease “branding” could
prompt Congress to act. “Mental health advocates started
referring to schizophrenia as a ‘brain disease’ and showing
brain scans to members of Congress to get them to increase
funding for research. It really worked,” he said (Leshner,
2009).
Several scientists have expressed the opinion that
re-classifying addiction would help them recruit more
young scientists into the field. “I think one of the issues
that has kept scientists from working on this is the same
[moral] stigma,” says a scientist quoted in a paper by
psychologist Rachel Hammer of the Mayo Clinic and
colleagues. “I think if we had a way of making this process
be thought of as a disease you are going to have a lot more
scientists willing to roll up their sleeves to work on the
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problem,” the scientist continues. Thus, Hammer and
colleagues conclude that “addiction-as-disease was an
important factor in scientists’ efforts to obtain funding and
build research teams.” (Hammer et al, 2013).
Many proponents of the brain-disease concept were
deeply committed to dispelling the stigma surrounding
addiction. As Leshner wrote in Science in 1997,”The gulf in
implications between the ‘bad person’ view and the ‘chronic
illness sufferer’ view is tremendous.” Medicalizing the
condition, they hoped, would rehabilitate the public image
of addicted individuals, transforming them from
undisciplined deadbeats to people struggling with an
ailment. This approach had its roots in the world of mental
health advocacy. Until the early 1980s, many people
blamed parents for their children’s serious mental
problems.
Then
advocates
began
to
publicize
neuroscientific discoveries, demonstrating, for example,
that schizophrenia is associated with abnormalities of
brain structure and function. (Goldstein & Rosselli, 2003;
Phelan et al., 2002; Illes et al., 2008; Borgelt et al., 2011;
Buchman et al., 2013). The science was not as secure as
advocates for the mentally ill had hoped, but the idea of
using the same de-stigmatizing strategy for addiction took
hold.
Many experts credit the brain-disease narrative
with enhancing the profile of their field. The late Bob
Schuster, head of NIDA from 1986 to 1991, admitted that
although he did not think of addiction as a disease, he was
“happy for it to be conceptualized that way for pragmatic
reasons… for selling it to Congress” (Schuster, 2007). For
decades, addiction research had been a low-status field,
disparaged by other researchers as a soft science that
studied drunks and junkies. Now the field of neuroscience
was taking greater notice. “People recognize that certain
decision makers and others are very impressed with
molecular biology,” said Robert L. Balster, director of the
Institute for Drug and Alcohol Studies at Virginia
Commonwealth University (Balster, 2004).
Psychiatrist Jerome Jaffe, an eminent figure in the
field and the first White House adviser on drugs (the
precursor of the “drug czar”), saw the adoption of the brain-
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disease model as a tactical triumph but a scientific setback.
“It was a useful way for particular agencies to convince
Congress to raise the budgets (and) it has been very
successful,” he said. Indeed, neuroimaging, neurobiological
research, and medication development consume over half
of the NIDA research budget. In light of the agency’s reach
– it funds almost all substance-abuse research in the
United States – it sets the national agenda regarding
which research gets funded and therefore the nature of the
data produced and the kinds of topics that investigators
propose. But Jaffe argues that the brain-disease paradigm
presents “a Faustian bargain – the price that one pays is
that you don’t see all the other factors that interact (in
addiction)” (Jaffe, 2007).
C. Conceptual Confusions Associated with the
Brain Disease Model
This sub-section addresses a number of conceptual
confusions. It starts by explaining that brain changes
associated with persistent seeking and using substances do
not mean that these behaviors are the signs of a brain
disease and that such brain changes do not mean that
persistent seeking and using of substances are involuntary
actions in the legal sense of the term, “involuntary.” This
sub-section then shows that the analogy of addiction to
conditions that are unquestionably diseases is false and
concludes with a demonstration that although no one
chooses to be an addict, addicts choose to persistently seek
and use.
1. Brain Changes Do Not Necessarily Signify
Brain Disease
On the one hand, every experience changes the brain
– from learning a new language to navigating a new city.
On the other hand, not all brain changes are equal;
learning French is not the same as acquiring a crack habit.
If brain changes signified a disease state per se, however,
we would all be diseased all the time. In addiction, intense
activation of certain systems in the brain makes it
challenging, but by no means impossible, for users to quit,
but this does not mean that characterizing addiction as a
brain disease is necessarily the most useful model for
explanation and treatment.
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Endowing brain changes with too much clinical
significance reflects the power of the increasingly
neurocentric perspective that researchers and the public
apply to behavioral conditions. Neurocentrism is a term
coined to describe the view that human behavior can be
best explained by looking solely or primarily at the brain.
In an instance of a brain disease, psychotic disorders, and
some others, the best initial treatments often manipulate
the brain directly (though medication, mainly). Addiction
is not such a condition. It is true that replacement opioids
such as buprenorphine can be stabilizing because they
prevent withdrawal symptoms and suppress craving, but
instead of focusing narrowly on neurobiology, as a braindisease model implies, there is greater value in viewing
addiction as a multifaceted behavior that operates on
several levels at once, including molecular function and
structure, brain physiology, motivation, personality, the
psychosocial environment, culture, and social relations.
The lower levels of explanation, particularly those
involving the brain, are simply one part of an enormously
complex causal and clinical story. Indeed, they are not
necessarily the most informative for most practical
purposes, such as the prevention and treatment of
addiction.
Over-emphasizing the neural level of analysis when
conceptualizing addiction impedes our progress in treating
and preventing it because it distracts us from paying
needed attention to users’ motives, to their unappreciated
decision-making capacity, and to their abilities to respond
to incentives. To be sure, addiction can be partially
explained according to how it operates at the level of
neurons and brain circuits. In this respect, arguably,
addiction is a brain problem. But it is also a personality
problem, a motivational problem, a social problem, a
cultural problem, and so on. There is no scientific or clinical
reason to privilege one level of analysis above all of the
others unless doing so enhances our ability to respond
effectively. At every one of those levels, we can find causal
elements that contribute to excessive and repeated drug
use and to potential strategies that can help bring the
behavior under control.
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In a 2016 article in the New England Journal of
Medicine, Nora Volkow and others contend that the more
we understand the neurobiological elements of addiction,
the more we come to understand that this condition is a
brain disease (Volkow et al. 2016). But this makes as much
sense as concluding that because we now know more about
the role of personality traits, anxiety and impulse control
deficits in increasing addiction risk, we can, at last,
recognize that addiction is a disease of personality. This
contention that neurobiological understanding of a
behavior entails that the behavior is a disease simply begs
the question. As Volkow et al. write:
In the past two decades, research has increasingly
supported the view that addiction is a disease of the
brain.… the underlying concept of substance abuse
as a brain disease continues to be questioned,
perhaps because the aberrant, impulsive, and
compulsive behaviors that are characteristic of
addiction have not been clearly tied to
neurobiology… (at p. 363)
The model does not “continue to be questioned”
because the linkages between addiction and biological
processes are not obvious enough, however. It is clear and
wholly expected, that a behavior as dramatic as addiction
would have neural correlates (Volkow, 2006). Assuming we
had sufficiently advanced science to identify such
correlates, the absence of them would represent a profound
upheaval of everything we know about biology in general
and neuroscience in particular. But those linkages show
only that the brain is involved with drug addiction, much
as the brain is involved with all discrete behaviors. The
linkages do not, per se, make the case that addiction is best
defined as a brain-based phenomenon. Indeed, we fully
expect more details about the biology of addiction to be
uncovered in the near future. But that won’t make it any
more a brain disease than it is now.
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2. Brain Changes Do Not Per Se Signify
Involuntariness
Essentially any experience that changes behavior or
consciousness must also change the brain. For instance,
brain-imaging studies report persistent changes in the
brain as a function of reading a novel (Berns et al., 2013).
Reading and writing this brief changes the brains of the
readers and writers. Thus, the question is not whether
drugs change the brain, but whether they do so in a way
that renders drug use no longer voluntary. The primary
reason to reject this claim is conceptual. Section II. infra
reviews the scientific literature.
Let us begin with meaning of “involuntariness,”
which can be either literal or metaphoric and normative. A
human bodily movement is literally involuntary if it is a
pure mechanism and not an action at all. Spasms and
reflexes are examples. In criminal law, this is instantiated
in the “voluntary act” doctrine that is an element of all
crimes. Metaphorical compulsion exists when the bodily
movement is an action, but it is done under a situation of
constraint or hard choice. Duress is a classic example. The
prohibited act a defendant performs in a do-it-or-else
situation is surely an intentional human action, but if the
choice is too hard to expect most people not to yield to the
threat, then we may excuse the agent. Which choices are
“too hard” is of course a normative social, moral and
ultimately legal question.
Duress involves two parties, but in one party cases,
such as giving in to a strong desire one knows one should
not satisfy, it is much harder to assess the level of
constraint because the subjective variables involved in
deciding whether sufficient constraint exists are hard to
assess. Such considerations led both the American Bar
Association (1983, 1989) and the American Psychiatric
Association (1983) to officially recommend the abolition of
“control” tests for legal insanity. The test for metaphorical
involuntariness in one party cases most always rests on a
behavioral analysis because intentional action is being
evaluated and there is no proxy measure, whether it is
psychological or biological, that is available to reliably
assess the level of constraint in these cases.
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Despite laboratories all over the world working to
find an adequate measure of whether a person could not
control herself, the line between “could not” and simply
“did not” is still elusive. There is no such consensually
accepted measure (Morse, 2002, 2004, 2016, and in press).
The conclusion that the agent could not control herself is
typically based on a reverse inference. If the agent
continues to engage in the behavior despite negative and
sometimes disastrous consequences and the agent reports
that she would like to stop, then we conclude that it must
be the case that she could not control herself. But this is
not a scientific judgment. It is at best a common sense
inference, and the question is whether it is correct, a
question addressed in Section II.
Addiction is a quintessential case of one-party
metaphorical
involuntariness.
The
necessary,
foundational criteria of addiction—persistent seeking and
using substances—are unquestionably human actions and
not mechanisms like spasms or reflexes. If the agent stops
persistently seeking and using, as so many addicts do,
either occasionally or permanently, the agent is not then
addicted. Moreover, in few cases is the agent forced to use
drugs by an external threat. The motivation is entirely
internal.
We explained above that all human action has
biological causes at the level of the brain. That is simply a
fact about human beings. If your brain is dead, then so are
you and you are not acting. We also explained that the
brain is constantly changing in response to various stimuli.
If changes in the brain signified involuntariness, then all
human action would qualify as involuntary.
Some
scientists and even some philosophers think that this is
true, but it is simply an example of unrefined biological
determinism that holds that if an action has biological
roots, as all do, then it must be a mechanism or beyond the
agent’s control. This philosophically contestable view—
and it is a minority view among philosophers of mind,
action, and responsibility— is certainly inconsistent with
the moral and legal structure of our society that makes the
morally powerful distinction between voluntary and
involuntary actions.
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Once again, whether sufficient constraint exists to
lead to the conclusion of an action being involuntary in a
one party case must be assessed behaviorally. We must
assess the psychological processes, such as desires, beliefs,
memory, and judgment, for example, that are implicated in
all human action, including yielding to untoward desires.
Neuroscience may eventually help us understand those
processes better, but simply because addiction seems to be
associated with certain characteristic brain changes, does
not per se mean that persistent seeking and using of
substances is involuntary.
We typically do not know whether and to what
degree the differing brain characteristics of addicts and
non-addicts are the result of addiction itself or pre-existed
the addiction. There are also not yet any population-based
studies large enough to understand the statistical range of
brain activity and brain anatomy. Consequently, we
usually do not know if there are brain “changes” or simply
different brains. It would not be surprising if both were
true because everything, including the persistent use of
substances, changes your brain. But ethical constraints
prevent us from doing prospective, long-term controlled
studies on human subjects to answer this question. Using
animal subjects sheds some light on the problem, but with
all due respect, most other animals (especially the rodents
that are the focus of most neuroscience work on addiction)
are not creatures like us that act for psychological reasons,
such as deep-seated angst, profound boredom, or concerns
about the future, although they may be profoundly
intelligent in some respects. An addict acts for these and
other psychological reasons; an addicted mouse or rat does
not. In any case, the existence of brain changes does not
per se mean the behavior is involuntary.
One might claim that, regardless of cause, the
different characteristics of the “addicted brain” are
“abnormal” and therefore associated behavior is
involuntary, but this claim is confused. We typically
conclude that the changes in brain are abnormal because
they are associated with behavior we have decided on other
grounds is abnormal. But that just regresses the issue to
one involving the assessment of behavior. After all,
scientifically rigorous neuroscientists do not go on “fishing
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expeditions.” They first identify what they believe is a
well-validated or well-characterized behavioral condition
that they wish to investigate because the behavior is of
interest for some reason other than it will have neural
correlates. Thus, scientists study addiction because they
have already decided that the behavior is abnormal for
reasons other than differing anatomy or function.
However, they presume a priori that the brain is the source
of the problem and go on to study the anatomy and function
of the brains of those people who persistently seek and use
drugs despite the negative consequences of these actions.
And as explained earlier in this sub-section, there are no
consensually validated behavioral measures of control
capacity. Consequently, the virtually always correlational
findings of neuroscientific studies of this capacity must be
approached with genuine caution.
Also, even if an abnormal variable is causally
involved in some action, it does not mean the action is
metaphorically involuntary. Imagine an armed robber who
intermittently has episodes of hypomania characterized by
exceptionally high levels of energy, overconfidence and selfimportance. He only robs when in a hypomanic episode
because only then does he feel sufficiently energetic and
confident enough to engage in such physical, high risk
behavior. But for his hypomania, he does not rob. His
robbing is surely action and it is surely voluntary.
Depending on the nature of his psychological state at the
time of the crime, we might excuse him because he suffered
from significant rationality impairments, for example, but
that does not mean his actions were involuntary.
Moreover, the brain of an individual who has hypomania
surely instantiates certain brain states that differ from the
brains of those without this condition. Even abnormal
brain changes do not per se mean that persistent seeking
and using substances are involuntary.
Everything we say about whether brain changes
associated with addiction per se prove the involuntariness
of persistent seeking and using of drugs also applies to the
genetic bases for addiction (Morse, 2011, 2014). Twin and
adoption studies have repeatedly demonstrated a genetic
predisposition for alcoholism (e.g., Cloninger, 1987), and
the limited amount of research on the genetics of illicit
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drug use suggests the same for drugs such as heroin,
cocaine and marijuana (Tsuang et al., 2001). Excepting
such variables as linguistic accent and choice of religious
affiliation, all individual differences in behavior are partly
attributable to differences in genes, however, including
voluntary acts. The brain is the biological organ that is
necessary for choice, and brain structure and development
follow the blueprint set by DNA. Thus, there is no
necessary
connection
between
heritability
and
involuntariness. In support of this point, monozygotic
twins are much more likely to share similar religious and
political beliefs than are dizygotic twins, even when they
grow up in different homes and were separated before the
age of one year (e.g., McCourt et al., 1999; Waller et al.,
1990).
These beliefs, like all mental states and actions,
have genetic underpinnings but they are not necessarily
involuntary. The relevance to addiction is that a genetic
predisposition is not a deterministic cause of involuntary
behavior, just as drug-induced brain changes are not. If the
genetic basis for a behavior were a condition that negated
responsibility, no one would be responsible for any
behavior (Morse, 2011).
We agree that some brain
alterations are associated with psychological states that
can make it more challenging for addicts to make certain
choices, but Section II demonstrates that those changes do
not come close to eradicating the capacity to refrain from
persistent seeking and using substances.
Finally, we question the assumption that the
symptoms of addiction were ever officially designated as
“uncontrollable.” This is an important matter given the
charge that the probationer has been subject to “cruel and
unusual punishment” because she was expected by the
court to modify a behavior (drug taking) that is
intrinsically beyond modification. An examination of DSM5 is highly relevant here and it offers no support for the
assumption that SUD symptoms are “uncontrollable.”
According to the Manual, a person can meet criteria
for severe SUD if she meets criteria that fall under four
organizing categories. The category most relevant to the
matter at issue is called “impaired control.” Among the
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criteria that count as impaired control, according to DSM5, are “wanting to cut back on problematic use but being
unable to do so” or “using much more of the substance than
originally intended.” These are ambiguous criteria. What
does it mean to be “unable” to do something? How do we
distinguish between an act that is truly irresistible and one
in which an urge to act is simply not resisted although the
agent could do so? Brain scans are of no use here. And the
ample evidence on contingency management show that
addicts are indeed capable of resistance – whether they
exercise that capacity is another matter. Similarly, what
does it mean to persist in an activity when we don’t want
to? We often do something longer than intended (e.g., a
Boston-based professor taking a moment to see how the
Red Sox are doing when preparing a lecture; staying at the
office longer than promised; hanging out with friends
rather than mowing the lawn, etc.) and relapse may
equally well indicate ambivalence rather than “lack of
control.” These interpretations comport more faithfully
with what we know about how and why addicts quit drugs
than the idea that addicts continue to use because, thanks
to brain changes, they cannot do otherwise. It is worth
noting that after 1980, the DSM architects adopted an
“atheoretical” approach to formulating diagnostic criteria.
The idea was to keep definitions strictly descriptive and not
comment upon whether symptoms are modifiable.
3. Comparisons with Conventional Brain
Diseases Are Flawed
What’s more, addiction is a condition whose
symptoms (persistent drug use despite negative sequelae)
can be coerced or incentivized to cease. True, one might
coerce or incentivize a diabetic to observe his diet and take
medication regularly, activities which will likely result in
improved glucose control, but one is not coercing or
incentivizing the underlying mechanism. After all, you
cannot tame insulin dysregulation, the underlying
pathology, with contingencies.
Granted, some patients with diabetes, hypertension,
and asthma will experience exacerbation of their
conditions despite having followed instructions faithfully
(some autonomous physiological disruption clearly is at
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work), but addiction is not a condition that worsens
independent of the behavior of the addicted person.
Conversely, if the user follows expert advice – “do not use
drugs” – she no longer has the “disease” of addiction. This
is because, again, addiction is defined by signs and
symptoms alone. The addiction itself – that is, persistent
drug use despite negative consequences – is not diagnosed
by brain changes: the behavior is the disease. In other
words, observable drug taking constitutes the disease state,
it does not manifest it. Addiction is not a latent entity
(alterations in brain function) that causes observable
manifestations (drug use); rather it is the observable
manifestation.
4. No One Chooses to Become an Addict, but
They Choose Nonetheless To Use
The paradox at the heart of addiction is this: How
can the capacity for choice coexist with selfdestructiveness? “I’ve never come across a single person
that was addicted that wanted to be addicted,” says
neuroscientist Nora Volkow (Gugliotta, 2003). One could
say the same of an obese person: how many of us have ever
come across a heavy person who exercised his or her
freedom expressly toward the goal of becoming fat? Many
undesirable outcomes in life arrive incrementally.
But if addiction is a choice, why would anyone
“choose” to engage in such a self-destructive set of
behaviors? People don’t choose to use addictive drugs
because they want to be addicted. People choose to take
addictive substances because they want immediate relief,
or in some cases to seek out novel psychological or
physiological sensations.
Let’s follow a typical trajectory. At the start of an
episode of addiction, the drug increases in enjoyment value
while once-rewarding activities such as relationships, job
or family recede in value. Although the appeal of using
starts to fade as negative consequences pile up – spending
too much money, disappointing loved ones, attracting
suspicion at work – the drug still retains value because it
salves psychic pain, suppresses withdrawal symptoms and
douses intense craving. The brain disease model cannot
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accommodate the fact that people use drugs and continue
to use them for reasons.
The idea that no one wants to become an addict leads
to the much-promoted false dichotomy captured in a
statement by the former Surgeon General, Vivek Murthy.
In a 2016 report on addiction, the Surgeon General
presents a choice: “It’s time to change how we view
addiction,” he writes, suggesting that addiction is solely a
brain disease (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the Surgeon General, 2016). True,
addiction per se is not a character flaw, but neither is it an
involuntary process, which is precisely what “hijacked”
neurobiology and “brain disease” imply. But we should be
able to create a vibrant middle ground in which we both
recognize the choice-making capacities in addiction and
leverage them to therapeutic ends while advancing public
investment in humane care (Heather, 2017).
D. There Is No Evidence That the Brain
Disease Model Meaningfully Reduces the
Stigma Associated With Addiction
A robust literature indicates that biological
explanations of behavior do not produce some of the
responses that brain disease advocates had hoped for. For
example, they appear to foster pessimism about the
likelihood of recovery and the effectiveness of treatment
(Schomerus et al., 2012). This finding may seem
counterintuitive. One might think that a biological
explanation would be good news to a patient – and to be
sure, some people with mental illness do indeed find it a
relief. But when the patient’s affliction is addiction and
there are no medical cures to restore an addict’s disrupted
brain, emphasizing the biological dimension seems
misguided. We offer just two examples of a more extensive
literature on the effect of framing behavior as mediated
solely by biological processes.
Rachel Hammer and colleagues conducted in-depth,
semi-structured interviews with 63 patients in treatment
for addiction in alcohol and/or nicotine treatment centers
in the US Midwest and with 20 addiction scientists of
various kinds (Hammer et al., 2013). Interviewees were
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asked about their understanding of addiction, including
whether they considered it to be a disease. The authors’
conclusion from these data was that, despite popular
arguments that framing addiction as a disease will
improve treatment outcomes and decrease moral stigma,
such a framing is not only unnecessary, but may be
harmful. They observe: “Rather than a malady of the weakwilled, addiction reframed as a pathology of the weakbrained (or weak-gened) bears just as much potential for
wielding stigma and creating marginalized populations.”
(p. 28)
Kvaale and colleagues (Kvaale et al., 2013) carried
out the first meta-analytic review of studies looking at the
effects on stigma of biogenetic explanations of mental
disorders, including substance use disorders. Samples
included in the review consisted of lay people,
professionals, and individuals themselves affected by
psychological problems. The main finding was that
biogenetic explanations did appear to reduce blame but
also induced pessimism over the future prospects of those
suffering from these disorders. It was also found that
biogenetic explanations increased endorsement of the
stereotype that people with psychological problems are
dangerous, an understandable reaction to the idea that
addiction, for example, is the result of permanent changes
to brain mechanisms over which the sufferer has no
control.
II.

ADDICTS RETAIN THE CAPACITY TO
CHOOSE TO REFRAIN AND DO RESPOND
TO INCENTIVES AND REASONS

In the hands of those who subscribe to and promote
the brain-disease model, brain imaging is often intended as
a visual refutation of the existence of the addict’s capacity
to refrain from using substances.
In a typical imaging
experiment conducted with positron emission tomography
(PET) or functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI),
addicts watch videos of people handling a crack pipe or
needle, causing their prefrontal cortices, amygdala, and
other brain structures to activate beyond the base rate of
activity in the region of interest (the entire brain is active
all the time) (Goldstein & Volkow, 2002). Videos of neutral
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content, such as landscapes, induce no such heightened
response while the brains of comparison subjects presented
these stimuli are being scanned. The resultant technicolor
images of affected brain regions, which are simply graphic
representations of complex mathematical data and are not
“pictures” of the brain, are undeniably arresting. These
images are meant to convince us that the mere will to
change or choice in the face of rewards or punishment
cannot be expected to override these tissue or physiological
changes. After all, it appears that one can “see” the damage
inflicted on the now allegedly “broken” brain.
But seeking and using drugs can be affected by the
will and does respond to incentives, as this Section will
demonstrate. As psychologists and philosophers have
underscored, and as we explained above, the common
interpretation of pathological behavior as involuntary is
often informed by a primitive form of biological
determinism. If biological roots can be found, then we
reflexively think “disease,” and assume that its signs, like
seeking and using substances, are not actions but pure
mechanisms. Addiction may narrow addicts’ focus and
reduce their ability to take pleasure in non-drug
experiences, but it does not turn them into automatons or
slaves to their desires. They remain agents who can and
do react to a variety of sanctions and incentives.
The data show that individuals who meet the
American Psychiatric Association’s criteria for “substance
use disorder” (the technical term for “addiction”) stop using
drugs as a function of the factors that influence choices for
all people, such as economic concerns, legal concerns,
family issues, and moral values. To help put this conclusion
into context, these same factors do not affect the symptoms
of cancer, schizophrenia, or even diabetes, a disease with
significant behavioral aspects. That is, drug use in addicts
differs from the symptoms of widely recognized diseases.
But first, consider a few of the basic features of addiction.
As we explained previously, addictive drugs act on the
brain, producing virtually instantaneous changes in
psychological state that often include intense feelings of
pleasure, freedom from worry, and peace. However, with
continued use, the strength of the immediate pleasurable
drug effects decrease and negative effects begin to
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accumulate. Direct negative drug effects include tolerance
and withdrawal, and indirect negative effects include
socially mediated problems, such as fear of arrest, possible
job loss, problems with family members, and the host of
issues that accompany illegal or frowned upon activities.
Although this is a highly simplified, abbreviated account,
it yields clear predictions regarding the course of addictive
drug use given the assumption that addicts retain the
capacity to choose not to use drugs.
(1) We should expect an initial, positive “honeymoon
period” of escalating drug use.
(2) Then, there should be a period of ambivalent drug
use, for example, addicts will quit using then start up
again, then quit using, etc. (Indeed, many experts think
that ambivalence is an almost invariant feature of
addiction.)
(3) Finally, drug use ends.
The costs and benefits of drug use vary from
individual-to-individual, and alternatives to drugs vary
across individuals. Consequently, we should expect large
individual differences in how long each stage of addiction
lasts. Notice that this account differs markedly from the
claim that addiction is usually, let alone invariably, a
chronic, relapsing disease.
Recall that the idea that addiction is a disease is
based in large part on studies of addicts in treatment (e.g.,
McLellan et al. 2000; O’Brien & McLellan, 1996). However,
it is widely acknowledged that since most addicts do not
seek help from clinics, clinic-based research may provide a
biased account of addiction (e.g., Robins, 1993). To avoid
these biases, researchers organized large, nation-wide
epidemiological studies that recruited participants
scientifically. For instance, the subject pools numbered in
the
thousands
and
matched
the
demographic
characteristics of the nation as a whole (see Robins &
Regier, 1991 and Heyman, 2009 for the historical
background of these ground-breaking epidemiological
studies). Some participants had been in treatment but this
was not a necessary criterion. To date, four major surveys
have been published (Anthony & Helzer, 1991; Conway et
al., 2006; Kessler et al., 2005; Stinson et al., 2005; Warner
et al., 1995).
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The basic findings include the following: Most of those
who were addicted to illegal drugs stopped using by about
age 30. Addiction to legal, more readily available, drugs
(e.g., alcohol and cigarettes) persisted considerably longer
than dependence on illegal drugs (e.g., cocaine). Most
addicts quit using without professional medical or
psychological assistance For instance at about age 42,
between 75% and 83% of those addicted to opiates, cocaine,
and marijuana no longer met the criteria for addiction. In
support of this result, a study that carefully tracked the
time course of addiction revealed that the asymptotic
remission rates were higher than 90% for illegal drugs
(Lopez-Quintero et al., 2011). Importantly, the high rates
at which addicts quit drugs was not an artifact of high
mortality rates or other methodological issues (Heyman,
2013).
Most addicts quit and do so on their own. Addiction
seems to be among the most spontaneously “remitting” of
all the conditions termed major mental disorders, which is
a very inconvenient fact for the position that addiction is a
“chronic and relapsing brain disease.” Consequently, it is
reasonable to speculate that quitting was due to the
gradual accumulation of the negative effects of drug use,
particularly those related to the responsibilities that often
accompany early and middle adulthood. A large body of
research supports this line of thinking.
In interviews and memoirs, addicts identify both
practical and moral reasons for quitting drugs. The
following paraphrased quotes are typical: “I wasn’t raised
to be a bad parent,” “I wanted my parents to be proud of
me,” “I was too old to go back to jail,” “I could no longer
afford drugs and groceries,” “I knew I would die if I didn’t
stop,” “I wasn’t born in order to become a drug addict.” In
a study of heroin addicts, Waldorf (1983) quantified the
explanations for quitting. In order of most frequent to least
frequent, they were: “It was time to do other things,” “Had
no alternative,” “Fears of loss of significant others,” “Fears
of returning to prison,” “Concerns for health.”
Another type of evidence is based on the changing
history of the legal status of drugs and on changes in the
widespread understanding of their health effects. During
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the 20th century, there have been several nation-wide
changes in the legal status of addictive drugs and in the
understanding of their health risks. These events have
many of the features of scientific experiments, but we do
not have to wonder whether the results apply outside of the
lab. In the late 19th and early 20th century, opiates and
other addictive drugs were legal and could be purchased at
pharmacies and mail-order companies (e.g., Sears,
Roebuck and Company). The Harrison Act of 1914
outlawed the non-medical use of opiates and cocaine. The
result, according to historians and early monographs from
the 1920s (Courtwright, 2009; Kolb & DuMez, 1981), was
an approximately 50% decrease in opiate addiction.
The Volstead Act, popularly known as Prohibition
(1920), was followed by a marked increase in the price of
alcohol and a concomitant decrease in alcoholism, as
indexed by abrupt decreases in the rates of cirrhosis of the
liver (Miron & Zweibel, 1991; Seeley, 1960). Since heavy
drinking is a prerequisite for cirrhosis, the decrease in
cirrhosis rates suggests that Prohibition must have
brought about a decrease in alcoholism. These facts and
their implications have been overshadowed by the
unpopularity of Prohibition and the gradual return of
widespread heavy drinking in the late 1920s.
For much of the early and mid-20th century, tobacco
companies successfully undermined research that
demonstrated a connection between smoking and cancer.
However, in 1964 the Surgeon General published a welldocumented, strongly worded rebuttal that convinced
much of the public that smoking entailed severe health
risks including an increase in the likelihood of cancer. The
report was followed immediately by a striking,
approximately linear decrease in the prevalence of
smoking, despite the fact that most smokers who quit were
pack-a-day addicted smokers (USDHHS, 1990, 1964; see
Heyman, 2013 for graphs of these results).
The historical trends are exactly as expected if addicts
retain the capacity to quit drugs. In contrast, new laws,
increases in prices, and newly published scientific
information do not slow down the growth of cancer cells,
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restore the capacity to remember in Alzheimer’s patients,
or restore a receptor’s affinity for insulin.
Data from interventions that focus explicitly on the
determinants of choosing to continue or desist from drug
use are also supportive of the view that addicts can be
affected by incentives and reasons. Steve Higgins, a
psychologist at the University of Vermont, developed an
addiction treatment program based on the ideas that
addicts would choose to stop using drugs if there was a
concrete and relatively immediate reason to do so and that
they would remain abstinent if they became involved in
rewarding, new nondrug activities. The initial trials were
with cocaine addicts. If a drug test was negative, the client
earned a voucher for goods and services, such as
educational programs, and recreational activities.
Conversely, a positive urine test reduced the value of the
voucher. One control group received counseling but no
contingency, and a second control group got vouchers
independent of whether they had been abstinent. All
subjects met the then DSM criteria for cocaine addiction.
At every test date, the contingency group had higher
abstinence scores (Higgins et al., 1994, 1995). A surprising
feature of this success is that the vouchers were never
worth more than $12.50. This amount is likely less than
the client had been spending on cocaine. Yet, they chose the
voucher instead. This finding persisted at follow-up and
has been replicated. If cocaine addicts are stubbornly
compulsive, then once the immediate reward for abstinence
is gone, they should start using cocaine again. However, at
every follow-up date, voucher subjects were more likely to
have drug-free urines. Most interestingly, the percentage
of drug-free samples increased from about 60% to almost
80% for the voucher group.
The subjects in the Vermont study were treatment
seekers, who presumably wanted to change. Would
contingencies work on drug addicts who did not volunteer
to seek help? Physicians and airplane pilots who are on
probation for drug use provide a handy test of this
question. The physicians and pilots were compelled to
enter treatment and forced to make themselves available
for random testing. If they tested positive, they risked
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permanently losing their license to practice and the income
and status associated with such prestigious professions.
Given how much was at stake for the lives of these subjects,
they had very strong reasons to cease using and they did.
The abstinence rates were typically above 80% and
averaged close to 90% (Coombs, 1997, graphs in Heyman,
2009).
It is reasonable to suppose that such high abstinence
rates reflect the individual characteristics correlated with
the responsibilities and skills involved in medicine and
piloting an airplane. However, a similar program with men
and women on probation in the criminal justice system
obtained similar results. Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation
with Enforcement (HOPE) program is an innovative
approach to the problem of high rates of drug use among
men and women in prison (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009). The
program focuses on the post-release probation period, with
the aim of breaking the vicious correlation between drug
use and recidivism. The terms of parole include a contract
to abstain from illegal drugs. To ensure that the
probationers maintained their end of the bargain, they
were subject to random drug tests. Positive tests resulted
in a few days back in jail. The key finding was that drug
use decreased by more than 80% within the first three
months of the contingency plan and by more than 90% at
six months (Hawken & Kleiman, 2009). A control group
composed of probationers who were not under threat of
immediate consequences for drug use continued to use
drugs at the same rate as at the start of their probation.
The intervention results tell the same story as the
epidemiological research, self-reports by addicts, and the
historical record: addicts can choose to stop using drugs;
they retain the capacity to quit. In contrast, the
interventions that help addicts to quit drugs would not
alleviate the symptoms of diseases that defenders of the
disease model say addiction is similar to (e.g., McLellan et
al., 2000; O’Brien & McLellan, 1996). No one could
reasonably suppose that rewards persuade tumors to
shrink. But rewards persuade addicts to reduce drug use.
Many other studies also confirm that addicts respond
to incentives. Here are a few excellent further examples. A
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classic demonstration of the power of incentives was the
military’s Operation Golden Flow (Gupta, 2015). In
Vietnam, between ten and twenty-five percent of GI’s were
addicted to high-grade, freely-available heroin. In 1971,
President Nixon commanded the military to begin drug
testing. No soldier could board a plane home until he had
passed a urine test. As word of the new directive spread,
most GIs stopped using narcotics, and almost all soldiers
who were detained passed the test on their second try.
Once they were home, heroin apparently lost its appeal
(Robins et al., 1974). Opiates may have helped them endure
the war’s alternating bouts of boredom and terror, but
stateside, civilian life took precedence. Only five percent of
the men who became addicted in Vietnam relapsed within
ten months after return, and just twelve relapsed briefly
within three years.
Consider the following fMRI experiment by
researchers at Yale and Columbia. They found that the
brains of smokers reporting a strong desire to smoke
displayed enhanced activation of reward circuitry, as
would be expected (Westbrook et al., 2011). But they also
suggested that subjects could reduce craving by
considering the long-term consequences of smoking, such
as cancer or emphysema, while observing videos depicting
people smoking. When subjects did so, their brains
displayed enhanced activity in areas of the prefrontal
cortex associated with focusing, shifting attention, and
controlling emotions. Simultaneously, activity in regions
associated with reward, such as the ventral striatum,
decreased (Kober et al., 2010).
Investigators at NIDA observed the same pattern
when they asked cocaine users to inhibit their craving in
response to cues. Subjects underwent positron emission
tomography (PET) scanning as they watched a video of
people preparing drug paraphernalia and smoking crack
cocaine. When researchers instructed the addicts to control
their responses to the video, they observed inhibition of
activity in brain regions normally associated with drug
craving. When not deliberately suppressing their cravings,
the addicts reported feeling their typical desire to use, and
the PET scans revealed enhanced activation in brain
regions that appear to be implicated in craving (Volkow et
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al. 2010). We use the word, “appear,” advisedly. Recall that
for methodological reasons, most such studies indicate only
association (correlation), and conclusive inferences about
causation are unwarranted.
These powerful findings illuminate the capacity for
self-control in addicts. They also underscore the idea that
addicts persist not because of an inability to control the
desire to use, but from a failure of motivation. Granted,
summoning sustained motivation can be a great challenge.
It takes a lot of energy and vigilance to resist persistent
craving. Studies on the regulation of craving also help to
distinguish behavior that people simply do not control from
behavior that they cannot control. We are again referring
to the elusive line between “did not” and “cannot.” Imagine,
by way of contrast with the behavior of addicts, promising
a reward to people with Alzheimer’s if they could keep their
dementia from worsening. That would be both pointless
and cruel because the kinds of brain changes intrinsic to
dementia leave the sufferer largely resistant to rewards or
penalties. In short, contingencies cannot produce recovery
or full remission of these conditions as it can in individuals
addicted to drugs.
Finally, we close this Part with reference to Powell
v. Texas, 292 U.S. 514 (1968). It is emblematic of our core
argument. Powell, was a chronic alcoholic who spent all
his money on wine and who had been frequently arrested
and convicted for public drunkenness. In the present case,
Mr. Powell argued that he was afflicted with "the disease
of chronic alcoholism,...his appearance in public [while
drunk] was not of his own volition," (p. 517) it was “part of
the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion
symptomatic of the disease,” and thus to punish him for
this behavior would be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
This is an extremely sympathetic case for a compulsion
excuse. The crime was not serious and the criminal
behavior, public intoxication, was a typical manifestation
of Powell’s alcoholism (he had been arrested for public
drunkenness over one hundred times).
The Supreme Court rejected Mr. Powell’s claim for
many reasons. Among them, Justice Marshall’s plurality
opinion was skeptical of the compulsion claim and
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concluded that it went too far on the basis of too little
knowledge. (As Part III. discusses further, we think the
same is evidently true for the probationer’s claim.) It
pointed to the uncertainty about the meaning of the
concept of “compulsion.” (Likewise.) Finally, the opinion
also suggested that it was unclear that providing a defense
in such cases would improve the condition of alcoholics.
(Likewise.)
Powell himself testified about his undisputed
chronic alcoholism. He also testified that he could not stop
drinking.
Powell's cross-examination concerning the
events of the day of his trial is worth quoting in full, as
Justice Marshall did.
Q: You took that one [drink] at eight o'clock [a.m.]
because you wanted to drink?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you knew that if you drank it, you could keep
on drinking and get drunk?
A: Well, I was supposed to be here on trial, and I
didn't take but that one drink.
Q: You knew you had to be here this afternoon, but
this morning you took one drink and then you knew
that you couldn't afford to drink anymore and come
to court; is that right?
A: Yes, sir, that's right.
Q: Because you knew what you would do if you kept
drinking, that you would finally pass out or be
picked up?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you didn't want that to happen to you today?
A: No, sir.
Q: Not today?
A: No, sir.
Q: So you only had one drink today?
A: Yes, sir (pp. 519-520).
On redirect examination, Powell's attorney elicited further
explanation.
Q: Leroy, isn't the real reason why you just had one
drink today because you just had enough money to
buy one drink?
A: Well, that was just give to me.
Q: In other words, you didn't have any money with
which you could buy drinks yourself?
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A: No, sir, that was give to me.
Q: And that's really what controlled the amount you
drank this morning, isn't it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Leroy, when you start drinking, do you have any
control over how many drinks you can take?
A: No, sir (p. 520).
Powell wanted to drink and had that first drink, but
despite that last answer, his compulsion did not cause him
to engage in the myriad lawful and unlawful means he
might easily have used to obtain more alcohol if his craving
was desperately compulsive. Although Powell was a core
case of an addict, he could refrain from using if he had a
good enough reason to do so.
In sum, although drugs change the brain and
addiction has a biological basis, research shows that drug
use in addicts remains voluntary; like other choices it is
subject to economic, social, and legal sanctions, such as
those imposed by the courts.
III.

THIS CASE HAS PROFOUND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS AND SHOULD
NOT BE DECIDED ON THE BASIS OF
CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND SCIENCE.

This Section addresses, first, some of the potentially
profound legal and social policy implications of granting
the probationer’s claim. It then turns to why caution
mandates that this Court should not accept the claim
A. The Criminal Justice Implications of
Granting the Claim.
The basis of the probationer’s claim is that she cannot
fairly be expected to refrain from using drugs as a condition
of probation because she cannot control her drug use and
therefore is not responsible for it. If the basis for this nonresponsibility claim were firmly established, it would state
a strong moral and legal claim. It is far from firmly
established, however, as we believe we have shown in the
previous sections.
Nonetheless, we consider the
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implications of the view that the addict is not responsible
for her use of drugs.
Let us begin with the effect on probation and parole.
Staying drug-free is a universal condition of criminal
justice supervision. Not only is possession of controlled
substances a crime in itself in all jurisdictions (see, e.g.,
M.G.L. Part I, Title 15, Chapter 94c, §34), it is well-known
that for many reasons, including feeding their habit,
addicts often commit other crimes related to the addiction.
If addicts cannot be sanctioned for violating this condition
of probation and parole, the state will lose this powerful
contingency management technique for assisting addicts to
remain free of drugs and for protecting society. The threat
of being incarcerated or re-incarcerated or sanctioned in
some way gives the addict an extremely powerful incentive
to stay clean. It will not always be successful, but as the
Hawaii program described in Part II indicates, it decreases
the rate of violations markedly, an outcome the elasticity
of demand for addictive substances predicts. NIDA’s
funding of contingency management indicates that there is
consensual understanding that such tools are profoundly
positive intervention to reduce persistent seeking and
using of substances. The existence of a specialty Adult
Drug Court in Massachusetts also testifies to belief that
imposing the condition of staying clean is efficacious.
What would be the effect of losing this tool on
sentencing judges and parole authorities? The inability to
impose sanctions will almost certainly increase recidivism
substantially. Many judges and parole authorities who are
conscious of their duty to protect society would hesitate
before granting probation or parole that might otherwise
give people a chance to live a productive life in freedom. In
an age in which our society is criticized for too much
incarceration, this would be an unfortunate outcome.
Paradoxically, if judges no longer granted probation or
parole and incarceration took its place, this might serve as
a deterrent to possession because the “cost” of this crime
would increase, but we doubt it. In any case, arguing
against probation or parole without the condition of staying
drug-free (and, indirectly for incarceration as a deterrent)
would be an odd position for supporters of the probationer
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to take because their argument in her favor currently rests
on the claim, in effect, that addicts cannot be deterred.
Diversion programs would be imperiled, if not
crippled. Various types of diversion programs for nonviolent crimes, including specialty drug or mental health
courts, depend for their success on the contingency
management tool of making staying clean a condition of
successfully completing the program with all the benefits
that accrue. If the probationer’s petition is granted, it
entails that virtually no diverted addict could succeed. The
rationale for these worthy programs would evaporate.
Can the effect of holding that probationers are not
responsible for violating the condition of drug abstinence
be limited to the context of probation and parole? There is
no principled argument for so cabining the holding. If a
jurisdiction deems addicts not responsible for possession—
which is a proxy for use—then the state will lose its power
to use the criminal sanction as one powerful regulatory tool
in its armamentarium. If an addict cannot control herself
and is “compelled” to possess in order to use, how can it be
fair to blame and punish her?
Many jurisdictions
legislatively preclude using addiction as the basis of an
insanity defense. As Powell and Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S.
735 (2006) respectively teach, no jurisdiction is
constitutionally compelled to include addiction as a basis
for legal insanity or to adopt a “control” test for legal
insanity. Massachusetts has such a test. Granting this
petition, which entails adopting the contested disease
model of addiction and the corollary that addicts are
incapable of conforming to the law, will ensure that
addiction will now be used to support the claim that an
addicted defendant charged with illegal possession should
be acquitted by reason of insanity. Such claims and the
adjudication of whether the defendant is truly an addict
will multiply.
The result will not be positive for addicts. As this
Court wrote in Commonwealth v. Bruneau, 472. Mass. 510
(2015),
“… a defendant found not guilty by reason of mental
illness faces harsh consequences because the
defendant is eligible for civil commitment under
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strict security, where he would be confined for an
indefinite period of time. See G. L. c. 123, § 16.”(at
pp. 517-18)
Under such a threat, addicts will probably not be willing to
raise the defense of legal insanity because the
consequences of conviction will be much less harsh than a
successful insanity acquittal. After all, potentially life-long
commitment, a practice the Supreme Court approved in
Jones v. United States, 463 US 354 (1963), a case involving
a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity for shoplifting,
will deter raising legal insanity. In the case of acquittals,
the state will inevitably exercise its power for the purpose
of preventive detention. This will simply confirm Justice
Marshall’s prediction in Powell that the effect of imposing
a “compulsion” defense would result in incarceration. The
only thing that would change is the name of the institution
from jail to hospital. If the probationer’s petition is
granted, the insanity defense might be well-justified by the
same reasoning, but defendants will be unwilling to use it.
It is by no means clear that a complete defense to crime
for addicts could be limited to the offense of illegal
possession. The most extensive discussion of this issue in
case law is United States v. Moore, 486 F. 2d 1139 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). Moore was an addict convicted of possession
who claimed on the basis of uncontested expert evidence at
trial that addiction was a disease and that he could not
control his compulsion to possess and to use. The trial
judge refused to grant Moore an instruction providing a
defense to possession on that basis. The D.C. Circuit
affirmed the conviction. There were numerous detailed
concurrences in this result, but it was so held essentially
for the following reasons: 1) there was controversy over
whether addiction is a disease and whether we are able to
know an addict’s genuine capacity to refrain from using; 2)
the defense would apply to any defendant with impaired
behavioral controls, even in the absence of an allegedly
objective cause such as a disease; 3) it would apply not only
to possession, but also to any other crimes committed to
support the addiction; and, 4) adopting such a defense
would undermine the strong public policy supporting the
prohibition of sale and possession of controlled substances.
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There were two very strong dissents. The first, by
Judge Skelly Wright, argued that the common law should
embrace a new principle according to which a drug addict
who lacks substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of the law as a result of drug use should
not be held criminally responsible for mere possession for
his own use. The opinion rejected the claim that deterrence
would be undermined as too speculative. This dissent
recognized that the compulsion claim might be difficult to
limit to mere possession, but evaded the problem by
arguing that Congress clearly intended that such a defense
should not go this far. (The majority thought this argument
was scant consolation.) In a second, partial dissent, the
chief judge of the circuit, David Bazelon, argued that the
principle behind adopting the defense applied to crimes
other than mere possession and that juries should also
hear evidence about compulsion arising from addiction
when other crimes were charged, including armed robbery
or trafficking.
The arguments in Moore are strikingly similar to
those in this case. And recall that the claim in Powell
involved public drunkenness, a claim distinct from
possession, because that criminal behavior was allegedly
part of the pattern of and a compulsion symptomatic of the
disease of alcoholism (we recognize that possessing alcohol
is not a crime, but the claim is analogous).
It might be argued that this case should adopt the
disease and non-responsibility claims because these have
now become firmly established. Sections I. and II. of this
brief deny this, but granting the petition will cast the
doctrines of criminal responsibility of addicts for many
crimes into dangerous, uncharted waters. Moreover, the
thinking behind these claims, which often rests on what we
have termed “unrefined biological determinism,” will
support claims that the very concept of responsibility that
is foundational for criminal law and our society is
unjustified. We are mindful of the dangers of catastrophic
thinking, but we fear that granting the probationer’s
petition may have the effect of starting to pry open the lid
of Pandora’s Box.
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Another implication of granting the probationer’s
petition concerns civil commitment specifically aimed at
addicts who are dangerous to themselves or others.
Massachusetts has such a law (M.G.L., Chapter 132,
Section 35). Although not criminal, such laws serve at
least one goal in common with criminal law: incapacitation
of potentially dangerous people. The primary purpose of
such laws is to provide treatment, not to punish the people
committed. If convicted defendants cannot be required to
remain clean, these laws might be used in place of
probation. Nevertheless, these laws do not provide the
same level of due process protection as criminal law; it is
not clear that the benefits intended occur; and they can
have quite disquieting unintended consequences, such as
housing in jails, rather than in treatment facilities, the
people who have been committed (Depew et al, 2014).
Granting the petition in this case and thus announcing
that addicts who are potentially dangerous cannot be
deterred by sanctions may well increase the use of this
unfortunate approach to addiction, especially because the
definition of dangerousness is so vague. In Jones, for
example, the Supreme Court suggested that shoplifting a
jacket was a sufficiently dangerous crime to justify
potentially life-long involuntary civil commitment after
acquittal by reason of insanity (at p. 365, n. 14). Justice
Marshall’s prediction of turning hospitals into jails would
once more be confirmed. Granting the petition will not be
of benefit to addicts in the long run.
B. The Need for Caution
We urge this Court to be cautious. As Justice
Marshall wrote about the similar claim being made in
Powell, “The difficulty with that position [that Powell
should be excused because his crime was allegedly part of
the pattern of and a compulsion symptomatic of the disease
of alcoholism], is that it goes much too far on the basis of
too little knowledge.” (at p. 521). As Parts I. and II. have
demonstrated, this is still true despite claims to the
contrary.
It may be true that the majority of addiction specialists
– but not necessarily premier scholars in psychiatry,
psychology, or allied fields - adhere to the monolithic brain
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disease model and believe that addicts cannot control the
action of using drugs.
Nonetheless, psychiatry and
psychology are imperfect, constantly evolving fields. They
do not control what the law may properly do. Their
classifications and concepts have purposes that differ from
the law’s. The United States Supreme Court said this in
Powell (at p. 526) and has repeatedly re-affirmed since, e.g.,
Jones at 365, n.13; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414
(2002); Clark at 752-53, 774-75. The American Psychiatric
Association concurs. The “Cautionary Statement for
Forensic Use” in DSM-5 states the following.
Although the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and text are
primarily designed to assist clinicians in conducting
clinical assessment, case formulation, and
treatment planning, DSM-5 is also used as a
reference for the courts and attorneys in assessing
the forensic consequences of mental disorders. As a
result, it is important to note that the definition of
mental disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to
meet the needs of clinicians, public health
professionals, and research investigators rather
than all of the technical needs of the courts and legal
professionals (at p.25).
In Powell, Justice Marshall recognized that there
was serious difficulty understanding the meaning of
compulsion (at p. 526) As the contrasting majority and
dissenting opinions in Crane disclose, there is continuing
debate about the meaning of “serious difficulty” controlling
one’s behavior and similar terms, such as compulsion or
loss of control, and about whether control capacity can be
reliably assessed. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion wrote
that,
…we recognize that in cases where lack of control is
at issue, "inability to control behavior" will not be
demonstrable with mathematical precision. It is
enough to say that there must be proof of serious
difficulty in controlling behavior (at p. 413).
In a rather colorful passage, Justice Scalia’s dissent had
the following to say on this question.
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This formulation of the new requirement [serious
difficulty controlling behavior] certainly displays an
elegant subtlety of mind….How is one to frame for a
jury the degree of "inability to control…? Will it be
a percentage ("Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you
may commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA [referring
to Kansas’ law governing the commitment of socalled mentally abnormal sexually violent
predators] only if you find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that he is 42% unable to control his penchant
for sexual violence")? Or a frequency ratio ("Ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit …only if
you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is
unable to control his penchant for sexual violence 3
times out of 10")? Or merely an adverb ("Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane
under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he is appreciably—or
moderately, or substantially, or almost totally—
unable to control his penchant for sexual violence")?
None of these seems to me satisfactory (at pp.42324).
DSM-5’s “Cautionary Statement” is also instructive about
control problems.
Nonclinical decision makers should also be
cautioned that a diagnosis does not carry any
necessary implications regarding the etiology or
causes of the individual's mental disorder or the
individual's degree of control over behaviors that
may be associated with the disorder. Even when
diminished control over one's behavior is a feature of
the disorder, having the diagnosis in itself does not
demonstrate that a particular individual is (or was)
unable to control his or her behavior at a particular
time (at p. 25)
The preceding sections of this brief indicate that debates
about the conceptualization and measurement of “loss of
control” continue.
As the majority concluded in Clark,
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Though we certainly do not "condemn mentaldisease evidence wholesale" [citation omitted], the
consequence of this professional ferment [concerning
psychiatric classification and its implications] is a
general
caution
in
treating
psychological
classifications as predicates for excusing otherwise
criminal conduct (at p. 775).
The history of psychiatry and psychology is littered with
discredited paradigms and beliefs that were once
considered orthodoxy or were “generally accepted.” We
urge this Court to be cautious and not to grant this petition
because doing so will implicitly accept highly contested and
evolving concepts and science as a basis for a legal policy
that could have the profoundly negative consequences for
addicts, the criminal justice system and for society
discussed just above.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This case raises important questions about principles
of behavior, criminal responsibility, and the sound and fair
administration of criminal justice. The probationer claims
that she should not be held accountable for her failure to
“remain drug free” as a condition of her probation because
she suffers from addiction, or substance use disorder
[SUD], wherein her continued use of substances despite
negative consequences is a sign of that disorder. Her claim
is flawed in a number of ways. As a straightforward matter
of definition, we note that nowhere in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric
Association, the most widely used taxonomy of psychiatric
disorders, is drug use in the context of SUD regarded as a
behavior completely beyond the control of the addicted
user. More substantively, the core of her argument, which
depends largely on the implications of the brain-disease
model of addiction -- namely, that the brain changes
associated with addiction render the addict incapable of
behavioral control – is demonstrably untrue. The mere
association of drug taking with expected neurobiological
changes in the brain is not evidence that drug use is beyond
control. This is abundantly evident from the large volume
of data demonstrating that addiction is a set of behaviors
whose course can be altered by foreseeable consequences.
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The same cannot be said of conventional brain diseases
such as Alzheimer’s or multiple sclerosis.
In sum, the best scientific and clinical data are
strongly at odds with the view that addicts are unable to
choose not to use substances. We believe that a decision in
favor of the probationer could have significant, even
devastating, implications for the future of treatment-based
approaches to criminal justice as well as for criminal
responsibility more generally. We conclude that the
probationer’s claim should be denied because it is based on
erroneous, refuted scientific premises and will have
negative consequences if it is accepted.
Respectfully submitted,
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